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Oﬀering secure and anonymous communications in mobile ad hoc networking environments is essential to achieve confidence
and privacy, thus promoting widespread adoption of this kind of networks. In addition, some minimum performance levels
must be achieved for any solution to be practical and become widely adopted. In this paper, we propose and implement HOP,
a novel solution based on cryptographic Host Identity Protocol (HIP) that oﬀers security and user-level anonymity in MANET
environments while maintaining good performance levels. In particular, we introduce enhancements to the authentication process
to achieve Host Identity Tag (HIT) relationship anonymity, along with source/destination HIT anonymity when combined with
multihoming. Afterward we detail how we integrate our improved version of HIP with the OLSR routing protocol to achieve
eﬃcient support for pseudonyms. We implemented our proposal in an experimental testbed, and the results obtained show that
performance levels achieved are quite good, and that the integration with OLSR is achieved with a low overhead.
1. Introduction
In the last decade, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
have been one of the most challenging fields of research.
Several new types of attacks specific to MANETs have been
detected and thoroughly analyzed in the literature [1, 2],
evidencing that securing these networks eﬃciently is of
utmost importance.
Communication anonymity, a field of research tightly
related to security, has recently received much attention
from the research community. Despite most proposals
have focused on wired environments [3–5], mobile ad hoc
networks have also received much attention [6–9]. Na´cher et
al. [10] present a comprehensive survey of anonymous com-
munications in mobile ad hoc networks, which emphasizes
on the vast amount of literature in this field. More recently
we can find several proposals addressing privacy and security
in the context of single-path routing [11–15], and even some
anonymous multipath routing proposals [16, 17].
The communication anonymity research field encom-
passes various topics [18] such as sender anonymity, recip-
ient anonymity, relationship anonymity, and localization
anonymity. In this work we are mainly interested in relation-
ship anonymity, that is, in avoiding that MANET participants
are able to identify the two communicating parties involved,
for example, in a VoIP call, thereby compromising security.
Typically networked hosts are identified by their IP
and MAC addresses; however, these can be easily altered
by users. The problem of IP/MAC address forgery can
be solved through a unique cryptographic identifier that
remains unaltered throughout time, and that must be com-
pletely independent from the network identifiers. In earlier
anonymous protocols for MANETs, the authentication issue
is either not considered [6] or a Third Trust Authority is
required to exchange a set of preestablished parameters [7].
A ring signature scheme is used in more recent proposals
[8, 9] where an authenticated key agreement protocol based
on a group-oriented signature is used to verify that a message
has been signed by one of the group members without
actually knowing whom. Hence, this scheme requires that
nodes have a priori knowledge of some trusted nodes in
the network; this means that other nodes, besides the
two endpoints, must also implement the protocol. An
integrated solution, known as HIP (Host Identity Protocol)
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[19], has been proposed to support authentication, security,
and mobility but specifically in the scope of the Internet
infrastructure.
In this paper, we propose HOP, a novel solution that
improves the functionality of HIP to achieve authentication
and relationship anonymity in MANET environments. In
our proposal we provide full integration with the OLSR
routing protocol [20] to adopt layer-3 pseudonyms in an eﬃ-
cient manner. Our solution is compatible with the original
HIP mechanisms and is integrated with the IPsec protocol
[21], providing a secure communications environment. The
proposed solution does not require the rest of the nodes in
the network to implement the HIP protocol or our modified
version of OLSR. Thus, only the sender and the recipient have
to implement HOP, thereby reducing resource consumption
on intermediate nodes, which is considered a critical issue in
MANETs. We implemented and evaluated the eﬃciency of
our proposal in a real testbed, showing that the impact on
performance is minimal.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is pioneer in
this area since no other authors have proposed anonymity
mechanisms for MANETs based on improvements to the
HIP protocol. Additionally, we implemented and validated
our proposal in a real testbed, including a performance
evaluation to verify that the proposed solution does not
compromise performance.
The structure of this paper is the following. In Section 2,
we refer to some related works on MANET anonymity,
focusing mostly on the performance assessment of the
diﬀerent proposals. In Section 3, we make a brief introduc-
tion to the Host Identity Protocol. Section 4 describes our
proposal to extend HIP in order to achieve anonymity in
MANET environments. The adversarial model is described
in Section 5. Section 6 presents HOP, a solution integrating
the anonymous HIP solution with the OLSR protocol to
support a higher degree of anonymity through the adoption
of pseudonyms. It is followed by a security analysis in
Section 7. Implementation details are addressed in Section 8.
Experimental testbed results are then presented in Section 9.
Finally, Section 10 concludes the paper.
2. Related Works
Although the field of MANET anonymity has received
significant attention from the research community in the
past decade, most of the proposals found in the literature
suﬀer from the following two drawbacks: (i) the performance
of the diﬀerent protocols has remained mostly untackled,
and (ii) no actual implementations and validation of the
diﬀerent protocols in a real testbed have been made. For
instance, focusing on the two solutions more frequently
cited—MASK and ANODR—the MASK protocol [7] has
only been validated through simplistic and overly opti-
mistic simulation tests. In the case of ANODR [6], limited
simulation tests with only minimal amounts of traﬃc are
oﬀered. More recent solutions suﬀer from similar drawbacks,
being that several do not include any performance tests
[12–14].
Concerning the performance evaluation of anonymity
solutions for MANETs, we find that some recent works have
specifically addressed the performance of anonymous pro-
tocols for MANETs. Liu et al. [22] present a comprehensive
survey and performance evaluation of diﬀerent anonymous
routing schemes, focusing on the existing tradeoﬀs between
the performance and the degree of protection. Through sim-
ulation they show that the processing delay associated with
public key cryptography based protocols causes performance
to degrade significantly. Another study by Na´cher et al.
[23] has shown that, for anonymous routing protocols like
MASK and ANODR, anonymity is obtained at the expense
of reducing performance values down to ineﬃcient levels
for both TCP and UDP protocols. In particular, they found
that ANODR’s throughput ranges from 10 to 100 Kilobits
per second, which is a really bad performance, while for
the MASK protocol these values range from 100 to 500
Kilobits per second, which is still considered quite poor. With
respect to UDP traﬃc, they found that excessive delay values
impede the use of applications with real-time requirements,
being the packet loss ratio also considered quite high. Dong
et al. present ARMR [16] an anonymous routing protocol
in which multiple routes and fake routes are established;
authors use simulations to assess the route request eﬃciency
of their solution compared to MASK and AODV. Defrawy
and Tsudik [11] evaluate the performance of PRISM and
ALARM, two protocols of their own design, in terms of
percentage of nodes exposed and routing overhead. Chen
and Wu [17] do something similar, relying on simulation
to evaluate both a single and a multipath routing protocol
of their own design in terms of message compromising
probability and routing overhead. Notice that most of these
works miss important metrics such as data traﬃc delay or
packet loss ratio.
In this paper, we oﬀer a solution to provide anonymity
in MANETs that is pioneer in the sense that it includes the
proposal description along with the implementation details
and performance assessment tests made in a MANET testbed
using real devices.
3. The Host Identity Protocol
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [19] was introduced by
IETF’s HIP working group [24]. It was designed to make host
identification independent from the points of attachment (IP
addresses). Such solution, among other benefits, is able to
solve the problem of tracking mobile hosts.
One of the main concepts introduced by HIP is the Host
Identity Tag (HIT). A HIT consists of a 128-bit identifier
assigned to a specific machine. HITs, diﬀerently from IP
addresses, are always permanent. This means that a host can
have several IP addresses that change frequently throughout
time without causing hosts to break transport layer connec-
tions between them since HITs are used to identify socket
connections instead of IP addresses. Therefore, the use of
HITs requires introducing a new layer between the routing
and transport layers to achieve the desired independence
between them.
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One of the main advantages of HITs is their close bonds
with asymmetric cryptography. In fact, HIT generation
consists of obtaining a straightforward 128-bit hash of a
Host Identifier (HI), which consists of a public key generated
through an asymmetric encryption algorithm. In particular,
HIP authors propose using the SIGn-and-MAc (SIGMA)
algorithm [25].
HIP was designed to operate in the scope of the Internet
by extending the DNS functionality to incorporate Host
Identifiers (HIs) and Host Identity Tags (HITs). Through
such a service it is easy for a user to discover and maintain
both HI/HIT and IP addresses for a particular host or
domain.
With HIP, the setup of a secure channel between
two hosts relies on a authenticated four-way handshake
based on the SIGMA algorithm. Such four-way handshake
includes a Request message from initiator to responder
(I1), a Challenge message sent back to the initiator (R1),
a Response/Authentication message sent from initiator to
the responder (I2), and, finally, an Authentication message
that is sent back to the Initiator (R2). During this message
interchange a session key as well as a pair of IPsec ESP
Security Associations are created (for more details on IPsec
please refer to [21]).
In the scope of mobile ad hoc networks, HIP suﬀers from
two main problems: (i) there is usually no access to a DNS
server for HI/HIT and IP retrieval, and (ii) it is quite easy
to track connections and their endpoints. Thus, a solution
specific for MANET is required when attempting to operate
in these environments.
4. Adapting HIP to Offer Anonymity in
MANET Environments
In this section, we present Anonymous HIP (A-HIP), an
improvement of the original HIP implementation oﬀer-
ing security, relationship anonymity, and limited sender/
recipient anonymity to MANET communications. The basic
assumption for our approach is that, for communication
to take place, end-points must be aware of each other’s
HIT and the respective public key (HI). This requires a
previous exchange of HIs/HITs between peers through a
trustworthy mechanism. This exchange could be achieved
using currently available technology by embedding HIs/HITs
on digital Business Cards and then use Bluetooth’s Business
Card Exchange function [26] (part of the Object Push Profile)
to make them available to trusted parties. Another option is
to rely on mobile telephony messagery for this task. However,
how hosts gain knowledge of each other’s HI/HIT is outside
the scope of this paper.
Our A-HIP solution adopts the concept of multihoming,
allowing each endpoint to use a diﬀerent IP address for
each destination. Through such technique, both sender and
recipient anonymity is achieved with respect to the rest
of users. In addition, we extend the standard four-way
handshake defined by HIP, allowing to translate HITs into
an IPv4 or IPv6 address anonymously, and without requiring
any DNS service.
Packet type HITsrc HITdst Data
Figure 1: Structure of a HIP message.
4.1. Making HIP Messages Anonymous. Before detailing the
proposed HIP message adaptations to achieve anonymity,
we must first introduce some definitions. Let HITsrc and
HITdst denote the source and destination HIT identifiers, and
let κiPub and κ
i
Pri be the public and private keys associated
to a certain HITi, respectively. We define the encryption of
message m using key κ as
m∗ = E(m, κ) (1)
and the message decryption using the complementary key as
m = D(m∗, κ′). (2)
With HIP, when two stations wish to exchange session
setup information, the messages exchanged must comply
with the format defined in the RFC for HIP [19]. The basic
structure of these messages is shown in Figure 1.
Since the Packet type, HITsrc and HITdst fields are
unencrypted, all participants of a MANET are able to identify
the two communication endpoints. Thus, in our scheme,
we propose encrypting all the fields in HIP messages. The
participants involved in a HIP session will have to use the







Message m∗HIP may then be propagated through the
MANET without other stations being aware of the communi-
cation endpoints, as desired. Nevertheless, all the stations in
the path must try to decrypt the message using their private
key(s) to determine whether they are the destination.
4.2. A-HIP Message Exchanges. Figure 2 illustrates the mod-
ified message exchanging scheme proposed. Before proceed-
ing we should remark that, in the scope of HIP, the Initiator
and Responder concepts are introduced to refer to both
endpoints, and they remain unaltered throughout the HIP
session. Therefore, they are unrelated to the source and
destination concepts, which maintain their usual meaning
and thus alternate in time, as shown in this figure (see, e.g.,
messages I′1 and R
′
1).
Our proposed scheme works as follows. Initially, a HIT
discovery packet is generated (message I′1), being flooded to
all nodes. Flooding is mandatory in a MANET environment
since the initiator has no knowledge about the responder’s
IP. Hosts receiving the message will use their private key
(κiPri) to try to obtain the original mHIP message. Only if the
appropriate key (κ
Resp.
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Initiator Responder
m∗HIP[Type 1, HITInit., HITResp., Null]
I′1




m∗HIP[Type 3, HITInit., HITResp., resp., auth.]
m∗HIP[Type 4, HITResp., HITInit., authent.]
ESP protected messages (IPsec)
...
m∗HIP[Type 16, HITInit., HITResp., update]
m∗HIP[Type 16, HITResp., HITInit., update + ACK]
U′
A′
m∗HIP[Type 16, HITInit., HITResp., ACK]
Network identifier updating
UA′
Figure 2: Modified message exchanging between initiator and
responder based on HIP.
making the HIT discovery process fully confidential by
avoiding HIT traceability.
The responder, aware of the initiator’s IP address based
on the initial request, sends a challenge message (R′1) back to
the initiator via unicast, allowing the initiator to associate the
responder’s HIT to its IP address. If the responder does not
want to communicate with the initiator, it may opt to block
the authentication process by not replying at all.
A new message interchange between initiator and
responder takes place afterward, during which a Diﬃe-
Hellman authenticated key exchange is used to create a
session key, allowing to establish a pair of IPsec ESP Security
Associations (SAs) between the initiator and the responder,
as defined by the standard HIP. If, later, either the initiator
or the responder wish to change their network identifiers,
they must then proceed to update the connection using
encapsulated HIP UPDATE packets (represented as U ′, UA′,
and A′ in Figure 2); since this is part of the standard HIP,
please refer to [19] for more details.
Long connection disruptions, which may be due to node
mobility, require restarting the base exchange to update the
existing security associations (SAs). In such case, a new
HIT discovery packet (message I′1) must be again flooded
throughout the MANET, as described before.
5. Adversarial Model
The anonymity improvement presented above avoids that
any intermediate host is able to read the HIT source and
destination fields included in HIP packet headers since the
whole packet is encrypted. Additionally, the trusted exchange
of HI/HIT pairs assures that the cryptographic identity of a
user is only known by trusted users. However, our adversary
model considers the possibility that an attacker may become
a trusted user by both parties, and is also able to establish
connections towards both hosts, as illustrated in Figure 3.
This figure shows three nodes tagged as A, B, and C.
Intermediate node C is the attacker, and our adversarial
model contemplates the possibility that it is able to partic-
ipate in the MANET as a regular user, as well as capture,
modify or inject information into the network.
Suppose that the adversary (C) has previously established
a HIP association with both A and B. As a consequence,
C is able to store the relationship between the identities of
both A and B and their current IP addresses in an IP-to-
HIT mapping table. Thus, when node A sends and encrypted
packet to B, C will be able to trace the source and destination
IP addresses. By consulting its IP-to-HIT mapping table, it
will then be able to deduce which are the HIT identities
associated with the encrypted packet, thus compromising
anonymity.
Our goal when facing this type of adversary is to prevent
it from guessing the associations IP-to-HIT associations of
the diﬀerent nodes. Below we describe a novel solution that
achieves this goal by avoiding that attackers having gained
the trust of all parties can easily determine the two endpoints
of any connection. To achieve this, a strategy based on the
use of perconnection pseudonyms is recommended [27].
However, since in this case we require layer-3 pseudonyms,
any solution designed to be used in MANET environments
requires full or at least partial integration with the MANET
routing protocol used. In the next section, we propose such a
solution integrating A-HIP with the OLSR protocol.
6. HOP: Combining A-HIP, OLSR, and
Pseudonyms
In this section, we present HOP, our proposal to achieve
enhanced anonymity protection in MANET environments.
HIP combines the A-HIP protocol with the use of
pseudonyms, which are eﬃciently integrated with the OLSR
protocol.
A pseudonym is a new identifier that is used instead of
the original identifier to improve anonymity. In particular,
we propose using multiple IP addresses per station (one per
destination) to achieve a higher degree of anonymity when
communicating. This way, when two nodes wish to establish
a secure connection, each will select a free IP address from
its IP address pool that is used as a pseudonym for that
connection.
Figure 4 illustrates the proposed solution. When node
A establishes a HIP association with node C, it will pick
one of its multiple IP addresses available (e.g., IP D). Such
pseudonym will be used as IP source address for the first
packet (I1) in the establishment of a HIP association. When
this packet arrives to C, it will also pick one of its pseudonyms
for the reply. The IP addresses used as pseudonyms will be
maintained for all the communications between A and C.
We can also observe how anonymity is now preserved: for
the A-C HIP association, A is using IP D as its pseudonym;
for the B-C HIP association, B is using IP F as its pseudonym.
When an association between A and B is established, both
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IP source: IP A
IP destination: IP B
Encrypted HIP
packet
A-C HIP association B-C HIP association





Figure 3: Anonymity loss with A-HIP.
nodes avoid using the previous pseudonyms. In particular,
A and B use IP E and IP G, respectively. Thus, although the
encrypted HIP packets for this connection may be captured
by node C, it is now unable to trace the HIT identities used
in that connection.
Thus, thanks to our solution, it becomes quite diﬃcult
for a malicious node to identify the two endpoints of
a connection since session initiation is made anonymous
by: (i) encrypting all packets (both HIP-related and data),
and (ii) avoiding static mappings between HI/HIT and IP
addresses.
6.1. Eﬃcient Integration of HIP Pseudonyms and OLSR.
Deploying the aforementioned solution in a real MANET
environment requires solving some technical issues. First of
all, we must prevent that the diﬀerent network nodes become
aware of the diﬀerent pseudonyms employed by each node.
To achieve this, each IP address must be seen by all modes
as if it was a unique IP address associated with a real node.
We accomplish this task through an eﬃcient integration
with the OLSR routing protocol [20]. In particular, we
propose modifying the OLSR routing protocol so that the
pseudonyms used by a terminal are announced to other
terminals as if they were real IP addresses. This way, when
a node wants to communicate with another one using its
pseudonym, it will merely send a packet to that regular IP
address, which is then handled by the OLSR protocol to
make sure it arrives to the correct terminal. Upon arrival
the packets are then processed internally without any further
transmission.
Focusing again on Figure 4, the pseudonyms used by
node A (D and E) and node B (F and G) would be announced
to other terminals along with the real IP addresses (IP A,
IP B, IP C).
An optimal integration of A-HIP with the OLSR daemon
requires, among other things, simulating the arrival of con-
trol messages coming from the fake neighbors (pseudonym
IPs). For example, the OLSR daemon at node A must
simulate the reception of control messages coming from fake
nodes D and E. These messages will be of both HELLO and
TC types, and shall contain all the necessary information to
simulate the topology shown in the figure, where node A is
selected and Multipoint Relay (MPR) of nodes D and E, so
that A is responsible for the propagation of messages coming
from this fake neighbors. This way the remaining nodes in
the network are unable to distinguish real nodes from fake
ones.
In our proposal, the OLSR daemon shall also oﬀer
automatic selection of pseudonyms, which means that the
daemon itself will be responsible for picking a free IP address
range to be used as pseudonyms, which simplifies the users’
tasks.
One of the advantages of our solution is that we maintain
compatibility with the original OLSR protocol, meaning that
nodes using the modified version of OLSR will benefit from
anonymity even when most of the nodes in the MANET use
the original OLSR version.
6.2. Prevention of ARP-Based Attacks. To support diﬀerent IP
addresses in a single node we configure the network interface
card to have multiple addresses. This way, data associated
with that IP address is processed by the TCP/IP protocol
stack seamlessly. However, an attacker could attempt to
detect such configuration to cause disclosure of pseudonyms
and compromise anonymity.
Figure 5 illustrates the attack process, whereby the
attacker (C) attempts to determine which IP addresses are
used by A as pseudonyms. With this purpose it broadcasts
an ARP Request asking for IP address A, which is received
by all nodes at 1 hop; the reply is used to determine the
MAC address associated with that particular IP. Afterward
it generates ARP Requests for all the pseudonyms it wants
to check, including the known pseudonym (in this case IP
address D) and other pseudonyms detected earlier. In case
an ARP Reply with a same MAC address is used for diﬀerent
pseudonyms, the attacker would find that all addresses are
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IP source: IP E
IP destination: IP G
Encrypted HIP
packet











IP A-HIT A IP C-HIT C IP B-HIT B
Figure 4: Example of the use of pseudonyms in the scope of HOP.
related to a single node, and thus the anonymity provided by
HOP would be compromised.
To avoid the attack described above, our proposal
includes a solution that consists in configuring the system’s
firewall to filter all ARP queries except those for the main IP
address, which must be enabled for normal operation. Thus,
the main IP address of a node can never be used in the scope
of HIP-based communications, being only pseudonym IPs
allowed for thus purpose.
7. Security Analysis
The proposed HOP solution is able to address most of
the security and anonymity concerns when communicating
in a MANET environment. Issues such as confidentiality,
message integrity, data origin authentication, connectionless
integrity, and protection against replay attacks are provided
by the IPsec framework, which works in combination with
HOP.
HOP attempts to oﬀer relationship anonymity at the
HIP protocol level (between the network and the transport
layer), which was our current aim. This was achieved by
creating a false topology that can mixes real and pseudonym
nodes, which prevents an attacker from determining which
IP addresses are being used by each terminal.
Since each terminal is able to adopt multiple identities,
the attacker is forced to track the entire path of a packet
in order to be able to determine which are the two
communicating endpoints. Thus, the actions required for
an attacker to get a chance at breaking anonymity are (i)
the attacker has to initiate secure connections towards all
known users (whose HITs are cached) and simultaneously
try to obtain the geographic locations of such users; (ii) the
attacker must promiscuously listen to the on-going traﬃc
in the network and locate geographically the sources and
destinations of that traﬃc, which possibly requires being
able to gain awareness of all the transmission events that
take place in a network; (iii) the attacker will compare the
geographic positions of known users (whose HIT is known)
against the geographic positions of sources and destinations
of traﬃc being traced, and attempt to guess the IP-to-HIT
mapping table, thus breaking anonymity.
Obviously, such an attack is quite complex to undertake,
especially when geographical discrimination of users is com-
plex due to their proximity or the presence of obstacles (e.g.,
indoor scenarios). Moreover, the use of directional antennas
by users can also complicate severely the promiscuous
listening of all traﬃc sources.
8. Implementation Details
In this section, we oﬀer details about the diﬀerent software
elements that we had to adapt or improve in order to develop
the HOP solution proposed in the previous section. (Our
implementation is freely available upon request.) Our target
platform is a Linux/Unix system, and our goal is to develop
a fully functional testbed to validate our proposal and assess
its eﬀectiveness and performance.
8.1. A-HIP Implementation. The first step in our endeavors
was to enhance an existing implementation of HIP [28] for
Linux/Unix systems in order to implement A-HIP.
In Figure 6 we show a block diagram that illustrates
the diﬀerent elements that conform the HIP service for
the reference implementation, along with the interaction
with other software components. We highlight in the figure
those modules that required enhancements to implement
our proposal: session startup and I/O HIP packets.
Regarding the session startup module, the changes
proposed focused on encrypting all HIP messages using the
responder’s public key to provide anonymity. Concerning
the Input/Output module, changes mainly focused on
modifying the target of I1 messages at the IP layer for them to
be broadcasted and relayed by intermediate HIP agents. This
way they are able to reach the intended message recipient
in a multihop network scenario. The HIP daemon (hipd)
is composed by the former two modules, together with the
session management module that is dedicated to handling































































Figure 6: Integration of the HIP service with other Linux software components.
updates and terminating sessions. The HIP service as a whole
combines the HIP daemon with the IPsec module to provide
the full set of services required.
At the kernel level, a TAP driver communicates with the
TCP/IP network stack to allow the HIP service to detect and
temporarily block new connections, until a secure channel is
established.
Applications attempting to anonymously contact
another MANET user can identify the destination by relying
on notation <domain.hip>. All DNS resolutions in the
.hip domain are intercepted and handled internally by the
HIP service, which must provide a mapping to a specific
IP address. In our case the modified HIP session startup
phase begins, allowing the establishment of a temporary
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mapping between the recipient’s HIT and one of its current
IP addresses. Data packets are afterward transferred securely
using IPsec technology.
8.2. Optimal Dissemination of I′1 Messages Using OLSR.
OLSR [20] is a proactive routing protocol for MANETs.
As such, it creates and continually maintains routes to all
stations participating in the MANET. Route maintenance
is achieved by propagating Topology Control (TC) messages
throughout the MANET using Multipoint Relay (MPR)
nodes. These nodes are a subset of the stations participating
in the MANET which conforms a minimum spanning tree
(MST). Thus, message propagation through MPR rebroad-
casting oﬀers high eﬃciency with little cost in terms of
imposed traﬃc overhead.
The basic A-HIP solution requires the HIP software
itself to be in charge of propagating I′1 messages, achieving
what is usually called an application level broadcast scheme.
As an alternative to this solution, we propose an eﬃcient
integration of our proposal with OLSR which is achieved by
configuring the latter to forward broadcasted I′1 messages.
This strategy allows to optimize the flooding process by
taking advantage of the MST defined by the diﬀerent MPR
nodes, thus reducing the number of broadcast transmission
events in the network as we show in Section 9. Concerning




2), these will be for-
warded with minimum latency since OLSR provides paths
between all sender and recipient pairs with no delay by
constantly maintaining routes.
Table 1 presents detailed information about the packet
overhead introduced at session startup. We discriminate
the number of transmissions associated with each startup
message for the sake of clarity.
In this table, MSTi is the minimum spanning tree defined
by the diﬀerent MPRs as seen by node i, HC refers to the
number of hops between sender and recipient, and N refers
to the total number of nodes.
With respect to OLSR, a single broadcast flooding is
required for the first message. The proposed optimization
reduces the total amount of packets transmitted by limiting
rebroadcast events to MPR nodes (N − MSTi packets less).
For high node densities in the MANET, this optimization
becomes quite relevant compared to the default solution.
Taking a typical example where we have a MANET with
50 nodes, with an average hop count of 4 and an average
MST size of 10, the high degree of integration with OLSR
achieved by our HOP solution allows reducing the number
of transmissions from 62 to 22 (a reduction of 65%). Also,
notice that HOP allows reaching a near-minimum number
of transmission events, which in our example would be of
16.
8.3. Eﬃcient OLSR Support for Pseudonyms. Supporting
the proposed HOP solution requires extending the OLSR
daemon to make it pseudonym aware. The proposed strategy
consisted in simulating the reception of OLSR messages
coming from the fake neighbors in the following manner:
each node using pseudonyms will be receiving fabricated
Figure 7: Snapshot of the testbed used for performance evaluation
tests.
messages of both HELLO and TC types coming from each
of the fake neighbors used as pseudonyms. In particular, we
simulate the reception of HELLO messages coming from a
pseudonym IP every 5 seconds. These messages will inform
about the existence of a symmetric link between the fake
node and the real node. Additionally, we simulate that the
fake node picks the real node as its MPR, meaning that the
latter should propagate any TC messages generated by the
former one.
Similarly to HELLO messages, we simulate a TC message
reception event coming from the diﬀerent pseudonym IPs
every 5 seconds, which are marked for forwarding. Another
optimization that we adopt for our solution is the grouping
of several TC messages separated by short intervals of time
in a same OLSR packet. Such approach reduces the control
overhead in the MANET, and thus the number of times a
node has to compete for access to the shared medium.
9. Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposal,
focusing both on the eﬃciency of the OLSR integration
process and on the overall system performance.
To accomplish this task we set up a small testbed com-
posed of four Asus EeePC 901 netbooks and a desktop PC
(see Figure 7). We configured their IEEE 802.11g integrated
wireless cards (Ralink RT 2860 chipset [29]) in the ad hoc
mode, and we fixed the data rate at 54 Mbit/s. All the
terminals involved in the testbed had a GNU/Linux operating
system installed, kernel version 2.6.24. The Ralink wireless
card drivers used were version 1.7.0.0.
Concerning the OLSR protocol, we used the version
made available by the olsr.org team [30].
Using the iptables tool [31], we enforced a chain topology
that allowed us to assess performance at diﬀerent hop counts
between source and destination. Notice that, in this setup, a
manual preloading of the source’s cache with the IP address
of the destination was required to allow the default HIP
implementation contact stations at more than one hop away.
Obviously, such approach is not required for HOP.
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Table 1: Packet overhead introduced at session startup.
Mode of operation
Number of Tx per message








A-HIP N HC HC HC N + 3×HC
HOP MSTi HC HC HC MSTi + 3×HC
Ideal solution HC HC HC HC 4×HC
9.1. OLSR Control Overhead. In this section, we analyze
the control overhead imposed by the OLSR protocol, as
well as the additional overhead introduced by the use of
pseudonyms in our HOP solution.
According to the OLSR specification, each node should
generate HELLO messages every 2 seconds and TC messages
every 5 seconds, that is, about 0.7 messages per second.
Additionally, some of the nodes should propagate TC
messages received from their neighbors if they were chosen
to be their MPRs. With the HOP solution, each node should
additionally forward one TC message per each pseudonym
used.
Below we study the total number of OLSR packets
generated, as well as their sizes. The results are obtained
from a 60-second period, and after the network topology
converged to a steady state. The scenarios analyzed are the
following:
(i) Scenario #1: Standard OLSR,
(ii) Scenario #2: HOP using 2 pseudonyms per node,
(iii) Scenario #3: HOP using 3 pseudonyms per node.
Figure 8 shows the number of messages for the three dif-
ferent scenarios under analysis. Notice that, in all scenarios,
the sum of the HELLO and TC messages generated is always
less than the total number of OLSR messages generated.
For the standard OLSR solution (scenario #1) this occurs
because all messages queued within a short time interval are
encapsulated in a same OLSR packet. For scenarios #2 and
#3 the number of TC messages generated is much higher due
to the presence of pseudonyms. However, HOP synchronizes
the generation of the TC messages belonging to the diﬀerent
pseudonyms, thus allowing them to be encapsulated within a
same OLSR packet. This explains why, despite the significant
increase in terms of TC messages, the actual number of OLSR
messages increases only slightly.
We now focus in detail on the sizes of the messages
generated. According to the OLSR RFC, the header size for
both TC and HELLO messages is of 12 bytes. The body of
TC messages varies according to the number of neighbors
of each particular node, occupying 4 bytes (minimum) plus
8 bytes per neighbor. In the case of HELLO messages, the
size depends not only on the number of neighbors, but
also on the neighbor characteristics (e.g., link symmetry,
MPR selection). Thus the number of bytes ranges from 8
to 12 bytes per neighbor, in addition to other data. Figure 9
shows how the sizes of the TC and HELLO messages as we
increase the number of neighbors (real or pseudonyms) in
the network. For HELLO messages we include the best- and



























Figure 8: Details about the number of HELLO and TC messages
created in the three diﬀerent scenarios, along with the actual
number of OLSR packets injected into the network.
Table 2: Data rate and network utilization for OLSR traﬃc in
diﬀerent scenarios.
Mean data rate Mean network utilization
Scenario #1 2.2 kbit/s 0.010%
Scenario #2 4.6 kbit/s 0.021%
Scenario #3 5.5 kbit/s 0.026%
will be generally small, being that several can fit into a same
packet, as desired.
To conclude our analysis of the control overhead associ-
ated with OLSR and HIP, we have calculated both the mean
data rate generated by all sources and the mean network
utilization for our 4-hop chain network when assuming a
channel capacity of about 20 Mbit/s. These results, which are
summarized in Table 2, confirm that the OLSR network uti-
lization is insignificant, and that the pseudonyms introduced
by the HOP solution do not represent a meaningful traﬃc
increase. In fact network utilization is maintained below
0.03% in all cases.
9.2. Overall Performance Evaluation. We now proceed to
evaluate the performance of the HOP proposal. First we
will assess the increase in terms of session startup times
when comparing HOP to the default HIP solution (without



























Figure 9: HELLO and TC message sizes when varying the number
of neighbors.
Table 3: Encryption and decryption times for the diﬀerent HOP
packet types.




I ′1 (40 bytes) 0.56 1.31
R′1 (608 bytes) 3.7 74.8
I ′2 (659 bytes) 4.6 96.0
R′2 (216 bytes) 1.2 47.8
Close/Close ack (208 bytes) 1.2–1.9 22.1
anonymity). Afterward we analyze the average end-to-end
delay and throughput comparing HOP to an insecure
solution (No HIP), which is used as a reference to determine
the security/performance tradeoﬀ.
The session startup time is the time it takes to create a
HIP association, and it is measured as the time elapsed from
the moment the user requests the association until packet
R2 is received and fully processed. The establishment of a
HIP session requires four packets to be interchanged: I1, R1,
I2, and R2, which involves both a computation time and
a network delay. In our HOP solution all HIP packets are
encrypted, meaning that these times will be added to the
session startup time for the original version.
In Table 3 we summarize the time required to encrypt
and decrypt the diﬀerent packet types used by HOP. We
include session close packets also for the sake of complete-
ness. The overhead diﬀerences in time are mainly due to
the packet size diﬀerences. As can be seen, I′1 packets are
the smallest, I′2 packets being the largest (because they carry,


















Figure 10: Session startup times at diﬀerent hop counts for the
default HIP and the proposed A-HIP solution.
We now proceed to show the global impact of these
encryption and decryption processes in the proposed test-
bed. For all the charts shown in this section, we can state
that the maximum error for all the values represented (mean
values) is below 5%, with a degree of confidence of 95%.
Figure 10 shows the overhead introduced by HOP compared
to the default HIP implementation as we increase the hop
count between the source and destination terminals. We
can see that the extra encryption eﬀort required to oﬀer
anonymity introduces an additional delay between 200 and
220 ms. Since this overhead is limited to the initial exchange,
we consider that the tradeoﬀ achieved is reasonable, the
startup time being within acceptable bounds from a user
perspective. Also notice that the number of hops does not
negatively aﬀect HOP, the increase being minimal as for the
default HIP case.
In the experiments that follow we compare HOP against
an insecure solution. We do not include the results for the
Default HIP case since the performance values obtained do
not diﬀer from the ones achieved with HOP.
Figure 11 shows the mean round-trip time (RTT) delay
for diﬀerent payload sizes for both HOP and No HIP
(insecure) solutions. We find that the additional processing
required by HOP causes the RTT to increase between 0.4 and
1.2 ms, being on average of 0.7 ms. Notice that the relative
impact of this increase tends to disappear as the number of
hops increases—from 97% (1 hop) down to 23% (4 hops)—
since the additional overhead imposed is independent of the
number of hops.
In terms of throughput, Figure 12 shows that the max-
imum throughput achievable with the proposed solution is
of about 12.5 Mbit/s. This upper limit is inherent to the
CPU-bounded characteristics of the encryption processes,
and can only be improved by using faster CPUs or specialized
encryption hardware (notice that we are using low-cost
EEEPCs). As we increase the number of hops we observe that
the performance drop caused by using encryption is quite

































































Figure 12: Throughput at diﬀerent hop counts in an insecure mode
(No HIP) and using A-HIP.
limited, achieving throughput values close to those without
encryption. Therefore, in a typical MANET environment,
the impact on throughput will not be relevant, and it will
certainly not compromise the transmission eﬃciency.
9.3. Assessing the Impact of Mobility on Performance. As
described above, we validated and assessed the performance
of HOP using a real testbed. However, our tests were limited
to only a few nodes and no mobility. In this section, we
assess the performance of HOP in mobile environments and
with a higher number of nodes. To achieve this goal we
relied on the ns-2 [32] simulation tool. In particular we
picked a scenario sized 10001000 meters, where 60 nodes
are constantly moving towards random destinations at a
speed of 5 m/s. The wireless interfaces transmit at 54 Mbit/s
using IEEE 802.11g technology, and the radio range is of
250 meters. The routing protocol used is OLSR tuned with
an HELLO interval of 2 seconds and a TC interval of 5
seconds. Concerning traﬃc, we vary the number of source-
destination pairs, where each transmits CBR/UDP traﬃc at
a rate of 50 packets per second, using a packet payload size
of 512 bytes. We tuned the behavior of the system so that the
HIP-related packet interchanges and the encryption delays
introduced by HOP and IPsec were taken into account, being
similar to the values obtained in the real tests presented
before. Also, each participating node adopts three diﬀerent
pseudonyms.
The results obtained are shown in Figures 13 and 14.
Notice that, for the delay and routing overhead results
presented in the shown charts, we have a 90% confidence that
the mean is within ±10% of the values represented. For the
packet delivery ratio we have a 95% confidence that the mean
is within ±5% of the values represented.
In terms of packet delivery ratio, Figure 13(a) shows
that HOP introduces a small decay in performance. This is
expected due to the higher overall load in the network in
terms of control traﬃc (see below), which increases channel
contention and subsequently the number of collisions.
Compared to the testbed experiments presented in the
previous section using a static scenario, we find that mobility
has a significant impact on the packet delivery ratio for
both solutions tested since both rely on OLSR for route
discovery and route maintenance tasks. In terms of delay,
Figure 13(b) shows that the increase is moderate and remains
within strict bounds; remember that the highest delays
take place at connection setup, and so all the traﬃc that
follows merely experiences the delay introduced by IPsec’s
symmetric encryption process, which is typically less than 1
millisecond.
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Figure 14: Routing overhead for OLSR and the HOP solution when
increasing the aggregated load in the system.
In terms of routing overhead we find that, as expected,
HOP increases the amount of control packets injected into
the network (see Figure 14). Compared to OLSR, which
maintains a stable routing overhead value due to the
proactive nature of the protocol, the overhead associated
with HOP decays slightly for higher load values due to losses.
Overall, we find that the impact of mobility on perfor-
mance aﬀects equally an insecure MANET based on OLSR
and an enhanced solution based on HOP, the performance
of the latter always being slightly lower although comparable
to the former one. Thus, we consider that the simulation-
based analysis of HOP sustains the conclusions drawn before
in our testbed experiments, showing that the security and
anonymity strategy adopted by HOP does not provoke
any significant performance degradation to the system, the
tradeoﬀ being achieved between performance and secu-
rity/anonymity a quite reasonable one.
According to diﬀerent studies [22, 23], these perfor-
mance values are better than those achieved by other
MANET anonymity solutions. In particular, Marga et al.
[23] show that delay values for the ANODR protocol
[6] vary from 0.3 to 1.5 seconds whereas for the MASK
protocol [7] most delay values are between 1 and 2 seconds,
both significantly higher than the values achieved by our
solution. Liu et al. [22, 23] further show that, compared
to a insecure solution (best case in terms of performance),
most approaches found in the literature suﬀer from excessive
delays (often one order of magnitude higher than an insecure
solution) and a delivery ratio up to 20% lower compared to
an insecure solution.
10. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a novel solution to provide private
and untraceable communication between MANET peers.
Compared to previous proposals, we were pioneer at actually
implementing and testing our solution in a real testbed.
We relied on the concept of HITs to oﬀer user discovery
and end-to-end encryption of data through full integration
with HIP and IPsec technology. One of the main benefits
of our proposal is of being lightweight and easily imple-
mentable in real-life operating systems, as demonstrated in
the paper.
To achieve a high degree of anonymity, our HOP
proposal combines pseudonyms with an anonymous version
of the HIP protocol (A-HIP) that we also developed.
Additionally, the use of pseudonyms is eﬃciently integrated
with the OLSR protocol to maximize performance.
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We implemented the proposed solutions and evaluated
them in our testbed. Experimentally we show that the inte-
gration with OLSR is quite eﬃcient, being that pseudonyms
do not impose a significant overhead to the network. We
also find that the encryption process required for anonymity
during session startup time introduces an additional delay
between 200 and 220 ms, the total time always being below
500 ms. In a MANET environment, such initial delay is not
considered restrictive.
In terms of delay and throughput, HOP oﬀers the same
performance as the original HIP implementation. Compared
to an insecure solution, delay and throughput values merely
experience a very slight increase. The only exception was
detected for one-hop distances, where the maximum data
encryption rate was limited to 12 Mbit/s for the hardware
used in the experiments.
Overall, we presented a solution providing secure and
anonymous communications in MANET environments that
was validated in a real testbed, and that achieved good
performance levels. We also used simulation to determine
the eﬀectiveness of the proposal in the presence of mobility,
showing that the performance of our anonymity solution
remains similar to that of an insecure solution when
adopting OLSR as the routing protocol.
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